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Bird’s-eye view and worm’s-eye view: towards a
defendant-based approach in transnational criminal law
Sabine Gless*
Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, Faculty of Law, Basel University,
Switzerland
While the classic approach to transnational law provides a valuable tool for
identifying the legal frameworks governing transborder occurrences, it falls
short of covering all relevant aspects of transnational criminal law (TCL).
This article argues that criminal law – unlike other areas of law – is
fundamentally a state-oriented concept, leading to unique problems when
implemented across state borders, especially for the individual facing penal
power. A theoretical concept of TCL must therefore not only map
extensions of state powers from high above, but also look for the
individual’s position in the possibly overlapping normative orders on the
ground. The current predominant bird’s-eye view must be modiﬁed
according to the worm’s-eye view. In doing so, the speciﬁc features and
resulting problems of TCL will emerge. From this modiﬁed point of view, a
main challenge is the establishment of a globally recognised coordination
scheme, which will protect the legal position of individuals – particularly
defendants – affected by states exercising their ius puniendi across borders.
Keywords: transnational criminal law; defendant based-approach; general
principles; ne bis in idem; jurisdiction in criminal matters; conﬂicts of
jurisdiction; European criminal law
I. Introduction
For several decades now, scholars have been debating the emergence and conse-
quences of legal frameworks providing the structure necessary to exercise the ius
puniendi in a transnational setting.1 The historical dimension is central to this dis-
cussion: the founding and consolidation of state jurisdiction rests upon the West-
phalian model of a state, based on territoriality and a monopoly of force,2 which is
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
*Email: Sabine.Gless@unibas.ch. All websites accessed 16 February 2015.
1Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (Oxford University Press,
2012) 3–23; Kai Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht (CH Beck, 4th edn 2014) 2–5;
Helmut Satzger, International and European Criminal Law (CH Beck, 2012) 2.
2Daniel-Erasmus Khan, ‘Territory and Boundaries’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters
(eds), Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press,
2012) 225, 233–5.
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well-established in Europe and elsewhere and accompanied by the transfer of pro-
secuting power from the victim to the public.3 This development has not only
proven favourable for building state power but has also granted defendants a guar-
antee of due process when being charged with a crime.4 The phenomenon,
however, did not turn out to be a win-win situation for everyone involved, since
some defendants lost domestic privileges5 and some victims lost control over
the conﬂicts that aggrieved their rights.6 The adoption of criminal codes and the
establishment of state courts, as well as the appointment of governmental
judges and subsequently of public prosecution services (‘Staatsanwaltschaften’),
have been key factors in the rise of the Westphalian state because they allowed
speciﬁc state organs to exercise the monopoly of force according to public law
within a given territory.7 The concept translates into different forms of jurisdiction
– prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement – which all originate from a state’s
interest in maintaining its legal order.8
The emergence of transnational criminal law (TCL) – a special branch of trans-
national law pertaining to transnational criminal cases9 – calls into question the
basic features of criminal law, namely the monopoly of force within a given terri-
tory, since it rests on the assumption that states may exercise power across borders
in the ﬁeld of criminal law. This explains the ﬁerce political struggle, as well as the
legal debate, over a possible transfer of the ius puniendi from the state level to the
supranational level. In Europe, the debate surrounding a broad European Union
3For a recent analysis of criminal laws being public laws, see e.g. Malcolm Thorburn,
‘Criminal Law as Public Law’ in RA Duff and Stuart P Green (eds), Philosophical Foun-
dations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 21.
4See Frederick Mark Gedicks, ‘Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna
Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment’ (2009) 58(3) Emory
Law Journal 585.
5Sabine Gless, ‘Transnational Cooperation in Criminal Matters and the Guarantee of a Fair
Trial: Approaches to a General Principle’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 90.
6Nils Christie, ‘Conﬂicts as Property’ (1977) 17(1) British Journal of Criminology 1, 7–9.
7See, for example, from a historical point of view: Hinrich Rüping and Günter Jerouschek,
Grundriss der Strafrechtsgeschichte (CH Beck, 2007) 26–29, 97–99; Frank Meyer, Stra-
frechtsgenese in Internationalen Organisationen (Nomos, 2012) 601–11; from a philoso-
phical point of view: RA Duff, ‘Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law’ in Duff
and Green (n 3) 125, 131–41; from an international criminal law point of view: Danielle
Ireland-Piper, ‘Prosecutions of Extraterritorial Criminal Conduct and the Abuse of Rights
Doctrine’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 68, 69–72.
8On the various forms of jurisdiction in the context of criminal law, see Michiel JJP Lucht-
man, ‘Towards a Transnational Application of the Legality Principle in the EU’s Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice?’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 11, 17–23; Anna Petrig,
‘The Expansion of Swiss Criminal Jurisdiction in Light of International Law’ (2013) 9
Utrecht Law Review 34.
9I.e., acts that are not international core crimes but are committed in or affect more than one
jurisdiction. See Sabine Gless and John A.E. Vervaele, ‘Editorial: Law Should Govern.
Aspiring General Principles for Transnational Criminal Justice’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law
Review 1.
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(EU) mandate on shaping and adopting criminal law and criminal procedure
serves as a prominent example.10
By and large, little attention has been given to a theory of TCL up until now.
The various ﬁelds – such as law ﬂowing from ‘suppression conventions’ adopted
within the United Nations (UN) framework, rules governing mutual legal assist-
ance and European criminal law – have instead sprouted in their own peculiar
ways with little connection to each other. Only recently has the growing interest
in the basics of TCL led to new discussions about its theoretical underpinnings.
For some scholars, the crucial question is:What is the nature of transnational crim-
inal law? This question moves beyond the traditional distinction between two
bodies of law we can deﬁne quite clearly: national criminal law, and international
criminal law stricto sensu, i.e. the core crimes codiﬁed in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) and grave breaches of international
humanitarian law.11 For others, it seems more important to consider what transna-
tional criminal law actually does, especially with regard to the individuals affected
by it.12 The divide is not, as one might initially think, between theorists striving to
categorise and practitioners handling the impact. The divide is rather between the
particular legal approaches to TCL: on the one hand, classic state-oriented, inter-
national public law scholars see TCL as the international ‘suppression conventions
and the consequences for state policies in criminal justice’.13 Scholars of criminal
law, on the other hand,14 look rather for the effects of TCL enforcement on particu-
lar individuals, such as procedural rights and criminal defence on the side of the
defendant in practice, or a possible powerlessness on the side of the victim to
ﬁle a private claim on its own merits.15 What may seem an insigniﬁcant difference
10See, for example, the ‘Lisbon judgment’ of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht:
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr (1-421), www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
es20090630_2bve000208en.html, paras 252–5; Daniel Halberstam and Christoph
Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu Deutschland!”’ (2009) 10
German Law Journal 1241, 1250; Petter Asp, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence
of the EU (Skrifter utgivna av Juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms, 2012) 43–69.
11Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered
into force 1 July 2002); see Neil Boister, ‘“Transnational Criminal Law”?’ (2003) 14(5)
European Journal of International Law 953; Claus Kress, ‘International Criminal Law’
in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 6–9.
12For early contributions see Albin Eser, Otto Lagodny and Christopher L Blakesley, The
Individual as Subject of International Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Nomos, 2002).
13But ‘suppression conventions’ are not blind to individual rights either; see e.g.
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 17 December 1979, 1316
UNTS (entered into force 3 June 1983), Art 8(2).
14Classic textbooks on transnational or international criminal law include Boister (n 1) and
Christine Van den Wyngaert, International Criminal Law (Kluwer, 2nd rev edn 2000).
15See e.g. Malin Thunberg Schunke, Whose Responsibility? (Intersentia, 2013); Ester
Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart Publishing,
2012).
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at ﬁrst glance translates into various aspects of how TCL is seen: is the concern that
one state will infringe the ius puniendi of another? Or does the concern lie with the
individual facing numerous states all expanding their penal powers? This article
advocates an individual-based approach that acknowledges the individual’s pos-
ition in TCL, and especially pays attention to the legal position of the defendant.
Such an approach requires a reassessment of our understanding of the ius punien-
di’s impact in a transnational setting, and an evaluation of the consequences for
individuals. The plea for an adequate coordination scheme among cooperating
states – one that protects the legal position of the interests of individuals – is at
the centre of a new individual-based approach to TCL.
II. Deﬁnitions of transnational criminal law (TCL)
When academic discussions consider the concept of TCL, the ﬁrst question is:
How is TCL deﬁned? While there are quite clear notions of national criminal
law, as well as of international criminal law stricto sensu, a commonly shared deﬁ-
nition of transnational criminal law does not yet exist.
A. The classic deﬁnition of transnational law – and its application to
criminal law
In attempting to deﬁne transnational law, a natural starting point is the classic deﬁ-
nition as provided by Philip Jessup in the 1950s: transnational law is law that regu-
lates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.16 This deﬁnition can be
reﬁned for the criminal law context, as, for instance, Neil Boister does in the
current volume when he assigns to TCL the area of ‘crimes established through
treaty obligations in multilateral crime suppression conventions such as the
1988 Vienna Convention – the so-called “treaty crimes” or “crimes of international
concern”’.17 Such a deﬁnition is based on a law enforcement approach and holds a
public international law perspective but, at ﬁrst glance, works well for the identi-
ﬁcation of emerging legal areas of transnational crime control where new rules
transcend national jurisdictions and are thus ‘concerned with governance of trans-
national criminal actions’, such as UN conventions aimed at the criminal prosecu-
tion of certain conduct (‘suppression conventions’) or – more intensiﬁed – the EU
areas of freedom, security and justice.18 According to Boister, the speciﬁc criminal
law branch of transnational law, i.e. TCL, involves ‘the indirect suppression by
international law through domestic penal law of criminal activities that have (i)
16Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956) 2.
17Neil Boister, ‘Further reﬂections on the concept of transnational criminal law’, this
volume.
18Annika Suominen, ‘What Role for Legal Certainty in Criminal Law within the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU?’ (2014) 2(1) Bergen Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminal Justice 1, 3–6.
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actual or (ii) potential transboundary effects or (iii) transboundary moral
impacts’.19 This approach to deﬁning and assessing TCL, however, is primarily
concerned with the governance of transnational criminal actions by way of inter-
national ‘suppression conventions’ or other forms of cooperative law.
Therefore, the question is: does a continuation of the classic deﬁnition provide
an adequate lens through which the transformation of legal institutions can be
studied in an evolving, globalising society?20 The history, substance and effect of
criminal law suggest that it needs a slightly different approach: one more tailored
to the peculiarities of criminal law, since this legal ﬁeld stands out with regard to
its outcomes, namely a possible punishment. Criminal law therefore appears to
be state-ﬁxed because of its particular purpose of authorising a society’s response
to alleged crimes.21 The classic justiﬁcation for a harsh reaction, such as public pro-
secution or punishment of certain conduct, is that such conduct runs counter to
society’s will and therefore stands in opposition to the law of the land.22 This funda-
mental rationale can justify the grave consequences of government action that the
alleged wrongdoers face – such as search and seizure, imprisonment or even
execution.23 These distinctive features have determined longstanding principles
of criminal law and criminal procedure, shaped the legal frameworks surrounding
these areas of law, and inﬂuenced how we think about the ius puniendi.
B. The bird’s-eye view of TCL
In a manner of speaking, Boister’s approach in this volume to deﬁning and asses-
sing TCL represents the bird’s-eye view of the global landscape of normative fra-
meworks.24 The focus is on rule-making and rule-enforcement, essentially taking
a top-down approach.
Boister25 uses the example of cross-border money laundering to illustrate how
the origin of a particular asset is often concealed when moved across state
19Boister, this volume.
20Peer Zumbansen, ‘Deﬁning the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global
Governance and Legal Pluralism’ (2012) 21 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems
305, 307 et seq.
21See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press,
2010) 74; Duff (n 7) 131–41; Anne Schneider, ‘The Basic Approach to Jurisdiction in
Private and Criminal Law’ in Martin Böse, Frank Meyer and Anne Schneider (eds), Con-
ﬂicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters in the European Union, Vol II: Rights, Principles
and Model Rules (Nomos, 2014) 227.
22Duff (n 7) 125, 131–41. For further information on the implications of the ‘principle of
legality’ or ‘Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip’ for TCL, see e.g. Sabine Gless, Internationales Stra-
frecht (Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2011) 291–5; Luchtman (n 8) 23–26.
23On the part of the victim the consequence of state prosecution is the inability or rather
restriction to accuse in one’s own name or a collection of damages.
24Boister, this volume.
25Ibid.
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borders.26 Today, and more so than in the past, the rules applicable to tracing a
‘dirty’ money trail, as well as the rules governing whether a certain act will be
deemed money laundering, are not solely within the competence of a national
system but are rather issued by many different players.27 For instance, inter-
national law adopted within the UN system obligates state parties to criminalise
money laundering on the basis of, among other UN instruments, the so-called
Palermo Convention.28 However, no thought was given to the question of how
to safeguard individual rights at the international level. The national lawmaker
must then translate the international standards into national law, properly phrasing
the mandate placed on the individual by such standards. In addition, regional
bodies, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and its Financial Action Task Force (FATF),29 set standards regarding
how to handle assets that cross borders.30 Institutions handling money transfers,
and the bodies controlling them, may establish soft law by way of self-regulation,
like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCSB)31 or the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)32.
This unsorted coexistence of international, national and even private rule-
setting accounts for the legal pluralism33 typical of certain transnational law set-
tings, opening doors to adaptable models. However, in the ﬁeld of criminal law,
it may lead to a dangerous conﬂict of laws. When ‘two or more legal systems
coexist in the same social ﬁeld’,34 they may offer a ﬂexible solution to newly
emerging problems in cross-border situations, but this eventually leads to a mine-
ﬁeld for the individual who must abide by such (possibly conﬂicting) laws. Legal
pluralism in TCL is, to some extent, the result of a paradox. On the one hand, the
adoption of national criminal law, as a conceded claim of sovereign statehood in
26See, for different scenarios, Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolﬁ, A Comparative Guide to Anti-
Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, 2004).
27Mark Pieth, ‘Vor Art. 305bis Siebzehnter Titel: Verbrechen u. Vergehen gg. die
Rechtspﬂege.’ in Marcel Alexander Niggli and Hans Wiprächtiger (eds), Basler Kommen-
tar, Strafrecht II, Art. 305bis, 305ter inkl. Vorbemerkungen (Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag,
2013) 2671, Art 305, nos 18–43.
28UN General Assembly, ‘United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime’ (8 January 2001), Res/55/22.
29FATF Recommendations: Financial Action Task Force, International Standards on
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (2012),
www.fatf-gaﬁ.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.
pdf; for case studies see e.g. Herlin-Karnell (n 15) 146–222.
30Pieth (n 27) 23–32.
31The Basel Committee is a regulating body for banks, setting standards and providing a
forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. See www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm.
32The Joint Forum, Initiatives by the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO to Combat Money Launder-
ing and the Financing of Terrorism (June 2008), www.bis.org/publ/joint05.pdf.
33 For deﬁnitions, see Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society
Review 869, 870–4.
34Boister, this volume.
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the Westphalian tradition, stands as a self-contained punitive power inﬂexible to
other states’ wishes. Yet, on the other hand, such autonomous exercise of state
power may easily foil the Westphalian state promise of ‘one jurisdiction, one
law’. When, for instance, states establish jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
mitted against their citizens abroad, they de facto extend their state borders in
order to protect their own nationals extraterritorially.
The individual will not only wish to be subject to the law of one land alone, but
will also hope to rely on the Westphalian promise of legal certainty and clear direc-
tion on how to act in order to avoid punishment.35
Going back to the current debate surrounding TCL, the problem of conﬂicting
laws is neither surprising nor new. Jessup has previously discussed the ideal of
legal certainty as a possible obstacle to deﬁning transnational law as a valid
concept, stating that
one purpose of law is certainty. Individual persons, corporations, states, and inter-
national organizations must know the rules by which they should govern their
conduct from day to day; such certainty cannot exist if decisions are to be rendered
according to the whim of the judge who in his travels may have become fascinated by
the tribal customs of Papua.36
Thus, from the beginning, transnational law has involved a struggle between
the promise of Westphalian state order and the need for transborder implemen-
tation of certain norms. By now, one would therefore expect an abundance of theo-
ries focusing on the legitimate expectation of individuals as the addressees of
multiple state powers in a situation of transnational law and how to sort out inco-
herent normative orders. One would especially expect such theories in the realm of
TCL, since it places individuals in a precarious position. Theories that focus on
individual interests in TCL, however, are virtually nonexistent. Only recently,
when new ideas of global constitutionalism spilled over into areas of transborder
criminal justice, has the debate about the individual’s position in TCL begun to
inch towards the spotlight.37 However, the relationship between human rights
and judicial entitlements, or rather the tangible implications for an individual
affected by transnational criminal proceedings, remains unresolved in the
overall scenery of multiple sovereign claims for criminal jurisdiction.
35See e.g. Mark Pieth, ‘Synthesis: Comparing International Standards and their Implemen-
tation’ in Pieth and Aiolﬁ (n 26) 445–52; Ingeborg Zerbes, ‘Transnationales Korruptions-
strafrecht Gestaltungsmacht privater Akteure hinter staatlichem Regelungsanspruch’ in
Gralf-Peter Calliess (ed), Transnationales Recht (Mohr Siebeck, 2013) 539–54. For a
more general discussion in light of EU criminal law, see Sabine Gless, ‘A New Test for
Mens Rea? Safeguarding Legal Certainty in a European Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice’ (2011) 2 European Criminal Law Review 114; see also Suominen (n 18).
36Jessup (n 16) 107.
37See e.g. Herlin-Karnell (n 15) 232–9; Schunke (n 15) 131–4.
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C. The worm’s-eye view of TCL
The TCL landscape changes considerably as soon as one zooms in on a situation
of alleged cross-border crime and sees it through the eyes of an alleged wrongdoer.
The laws governing the investigation and prosecution of transnational offences
have emerged in parallel, yet uncorrelated, systems of cooperation between
states (such as UN ‘suppression conventions’ or within the EU or Schengen frame-
works) or even cooperation between states and private actors (like the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision, BCSB ).38 The prosecution side has driven cross-
border cooperation, and the interests of defendants have rarely been taken into
account equally.39 One reason for this shortfall may be that transnational law is
traditionally perceived as being addressed to states only (or other lawmakers)
and not to individuals.40 The initial focus and the current development are illus-
trated for instance by the Palermo Convention,41 which merely obligates states
to criminalise certain conduct, as do many of the OECD rules, while recent
forms of self-regulation (like FATF and BCSB recommendations) pay attention
to implementing mechanisms, yet still centre on crime control. The point of
view of the individual, who must sort out the potentially differing orders set in dis-
parate rules, is seldom taken into account.42 Legal certainty and the right not to be
subjected to arbitrary punishment, however, are judicial liberties based on human
rights.43 Yet human rights protection rarely forms a central part of newly emerging
international frameworks of cross-border cooperation. Traditionally human rights
38For case studies see Herlin-Kamell (n 15) 146–222; Pieth and Aiolﬁ (n 26).
39Gless (n 5); Ilias Anagnostopoulos, ‘Criminal Justice Cooperation in the European Union
after the First Few “Steps”: A Defence View’ (2014) 15 ERA Forum 9.
40Anna Petrig argues, that various suppression conventions contain provisions addressing
the right to consular assistance. Such provisions can according to Anna Petrig arguably
be interpreted as containing international individual rights, similar to those enshrined in
Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95, Art 36(1). She
refers, for example to Article 7 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221, 27 ILM
668) as well as to Article 6 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
(17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205). See on the individual rights enshrined in the Vienna
Convention e.g. Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Jan
Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International
Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 153, 168–9.
41Pieth (n 27) 23–32.
42Gless (n 35); Suominen (n 18) 6; for an account in international criminal law stricto sensu,
see Stefanie Bock, ‘The Prerequisite of Personal Guilt and the Duty to Know the Law in the
Light of Article 32 ICC Statute’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 184.
43Granted for instance in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 3 September
1953, 213 UNTS 222, Arts 6 and 7: Silver and others v United Kingdom, App nos 5947/72;
6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (ECtHR, 25 March 1983), [88];
Sunday Times v United Kingdom, App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979), [48]–[49];
EL, RL et JO v Suisse, App no 20919/92 (ECtHR, 29 August 1997), [51]–[53]; Robert
Esser, Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafverfahrensrecht (De Gruyter, 2002) 744.
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belong to the individual versus state context, and appropriate remedies are rather
hard to achieve when a state’s power crosses a border.44
It is, however, the individuals possibly violating the law who are most affected
by TCL. If they ﬁnd themselves in the position of a defendant, they may face
severe consequences. If an action triggers criminal proceedings across borders,
a defendant may be confronted with the claim of validity of a foreign law, he or
she may be arrested with the aim of extradition and held abroad, and may be sub-
jected to unfamiliar procedures in a language he or she does not speak or under-
stand.45 In a situation where different criminal laws conﬂict, individuals face a
dilemma that – unlike conﬂicts of law in international private law – they cannot
easily resolve. Such dilemmas can arise in quite different situations and may some-
times be rather surprising for the actors involved. For example, in the border
region of Germany and Switzerland, where nationals from both countries
cooperate in frontier trafﬁc, such dealings may on occasion include the transfer
of money from one country to the other. Laws against money laundering on the
two sides of the border, however, differ substantially. According to Swiss law,
only concealment of proﬁts gained from the commission of a felony is deemed
to be money laundering,46 whereas in Germany the mere concealment of proﬁts
gained by certain misdemeanours may qualify as money laundering.47 Therefore,
not only cross-border commuters but also bankers and other agents who never
leave their own country must prudently assess the possible legal consequences
of transferring money, since the validity of German law does not end at the
border. And while bankers (being part of a world-wide industry) may be
obliged to act with due diligence, conﬂicts of laws arise on all scales. If, for
instance, a group of both Swiss and German nationals participate in a music-swap-
ping club for newly registered local songs on both sides of the border, they may
quickly learn that their respective neighbouring home countries might evaluate
their business model quite differently, and that while their choice of corporate resi-
dence may be important, it will not necessarily save them from (possibly harsh)
legal consequences depending on the speciﬁc details of the business set-up. The
music-swapping club may infringe copyright laws on one side of the border but
not necessarily on the other, since Swiss law allows copyrighted music to be
44Interestingly enough, rather early TCL frameworks with reference to human rights intend
to protect the victim’s interests, which often is not primarily directed against the state but the
alleged criminal individual. See Jonathan Dock, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Crim-
inal Justice (Hart Publishing, 2008).
45Gless (n 5).
46See Article 305bis subpara 1 Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (Code pénale Suisse, SR
311.0, http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classiﬁed-compilation/19370083/index.html; for an
English translation see http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classiﬁed-compilation/19370083/
index.html).
47See Section 261 subpara 4 lit b Deutsches Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/stgb/__261.html; for an English translation see www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_stgb/index.html.
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downloaded for personal use,48 yet German law criminalises it.49 Furthermore,
according to German law, the concealment of gains resulting from a possible
infringement of copyright law can qualify as money laundering.50 Therefore,
certain ﬁnancial transactions with regard to the ‘local music sharing’ may
qualify as an act of money laundering only within a particular jurisdiction, but
not necessarily in the state of residence of the (alleged) wrongdoer. In Europe,
with its mix of states and justice systems, numerous areas of criminal law differ
across borders.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that defendants may not only be affected by
TCL when committing an act with consequences across borders. Individuals in
their home jurisdictions may, in certain situations, be expected to align their
conduct to rules set by foreign lawmakers or international self-regulating bodies
in order to avoid criminal liability.51 For example, the Swiss Penal Code crimina-
lises ‘insufﬁcient diligence in ﬁnancial transactions’ for persons who accept assets
as part of their profession.52 If they ‘fail to ascertain the identity of the beneﬁcial
owner of the assets with the care that is required in the circumstances’, they may be
held criminally liable. However, in order to determine the level of ‘care that is
required’ in a particular situation, Swiss judges will rely on FATF or BCSB rec-
ommendations, amongst other considerations.53
Therefore, TCL should not be deﬁned from the bird’s-eye view of a supposi-
tional lawmaker alone, but must also incorporate the perspective of the affected
individual.54
D. Towards a modiﬁed bird’s-eye view of TCL
In sum, TCL is not simply a ﬁeld shaped by treaty obligations of multilateral crime
suppression conventions, but a landscape with pitfalls and safe harbours for
individuals. A useful deﬁnition of TCL must therefore not only focus on states’
interests when allowing for a cross-border ius puniendi, but include all aspects
crucial to criminal justice. When Boister (and many others) consider the crucial
48Christoph Gasser, ‘Art. 19 URG’ in Barbara K. Müller and/Reinhard Oertli (eds), Urhe-
bergesetz – Stämpﬂis Handkommentar (Stämpﬂi Verlag, 2012) paras 5 et seq.
49Michael Heghmanns, ‘Musiktauschbörsen im Internet aus strafrechtlicher Sicht’ [2004]
Multimedia und Recht, Zeitschrift für Informations-, Telekommunikations- und Medienrecht
14–18.
50See Section 261 subpara 4 lit b Deutsches Strafgesetzbuch; Section 106 Deutsches Gesetz
über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz, http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/urhg/; for an English translation see http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_urhg/index.html).
51Foreign criminal law can, however, be relevant in various ways: see Böse, Meyer and
Schneider (n 21) 223–9.
52Article 305ter Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch.
53Pieth (n 27).
54Gless and Vervaele (n 9).
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points of TCL to be that ‘the actions and ideas of those who clarify, normativise
and apply the norms transcend territorial boundaries’ and that ‘[t]he actions of
the lawmakers are as transnational as the actions of the lawbreakers’,55 they
place too much emphasis on the power of rule-making and the enforcement capa-
bility across borders within the ‘suppression conventions’ framework.56 The
(ostensibly) transnational consensus on the punishability agreed upon by contract
among states, however, may only feign a legal order. If one zooms in on the rea-
lities from the point of view of affected individuals, TCL looks very different.
From the point of view of a defendant, TCL is not yet a coherent, clear-cut
legal framework but rather a patchwork of laws,57 made up of overlapping subsys-
tems of national ius puniendi.58 A deﬁnition that relies on an approach that focuses
only on crime control by international law might merely gloss over the real pro-
blems of transnational prosecution. TCL must therefore – as a ﬁrst step – be
deﬁned in a way that merges the bird’s-eye view with the worm’s-eye view, in
order to provide ground for an individual-based or rather a defendant-based
approach. This new, modiﬁed bird’s-eye view seeks the big picture, but rather
from the perspective of the individual facing the situation of overlapping norma-
tive frameworks.
III. A defendant-based approach to TCL:
coordination scheme grounded on general principles
The basic challenge for an approach that addresses the problems of legal pluralism
and conﬂicts of laws in TCL from the perspective of the defendant is the introduc-
tion of a coordination system – one which protects the interests affected when
states exercise their ius puniendi across borders.
By mounting cross-border cooperation on the one hand, while still holding
on to separate, independent powers to prosecute on the other, individuals could
ﬁnd themselves caught in a diffusion of states’ responsibilities.59 Without a
coordination system binding the use of the ius puniendi (for instance, how to
implement jurisdictional principles or a general rule on ne bis in idem across
borders) individuals may be left without protection. Boister contends in his
55Boister, this volume.
56Traditionally, textbooks on international criminal law are often organised around
‘suppression conventions’: see e.g. Wyngaert (n 14).
57Boister, this volume.
58See Wolfgang Schomburg, Otto Lagodny, Sabine Gless and Thomas Hackner,
‘Einleitung’ in Wolfgang Schomburg, Otto Lagodny, Sabine Gless and Thomas Hackner
(eds), Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters (CH Beck, 5th edn 2012) 11 (‘Vertragsgestrüpp’).
59See for a prominent example the discussion about law enforcement on the internet: Teresa
Scassa and Robert J Currie, ‘New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to
Jurisdiction’ (2010–11) 42 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1017.
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paper in this volume that, as a consequence of TCL, alleged criminals become
‘members of multiple normative communities, local, territorial, extraterritorial,
and non-territorial in nature’.60 What sounds like empowerment in Boister’s
paper may in fact turn out to be disadvantage, which is apparent when following
up on the example of the music-swapping club in the Swiss–German border
region: instead of gaining more protection, the entrepreneurs are exposed to
greater penal power. They seem to fall through the cracks, since criminal
charges could be brought against them in Switzerland or Germany, or both at
the same time, and for the same act.61 Even if Swiss authorities perceive the
group to be based on Swiss territory but refuse to initiate proceedings by claim-
ing that the deed is compliant with Swiss law, German authorities could never-
theless proceed.62
A. Balancing interests through a coordination scheme
As explained above, public prosecution is an important element of state
power, which affects individual interests in various ways and manifests
itself in many respects: the jurisdiction to prescribe, the jurisdiction to adju-
dicate and the jurisdiction to enforce must all add up in order to exercise
the ius puniendi effectively.63 In exercising its penal power, a state’s condem-
nation of criminalised conduct may not be directed at the wrongdoer alone.
It can furthermore carry a message for society as a whole.64 Criminal
law is intrinsically linked to the state authority of prosecution and penal
power.65
When states extend their ius puniendi across state borders, it may lead to
numerous unresolved problems. For example, is it only one state or can all
states prosecute and impose a punishment if they get their hands on the
(alleged) wrongdoer? Today, even if states cooperate closely, there is rarely a
60Boister, this volume.
61For the question whether Schengen Implementing Convention Art 65 applies, see
Andreas Eicker, Transstaatliche Strafverfolgung – Ein Beitrag zur Europäisierung, Inter-
nationalisierung und Fortentwicklung des Grundsatzes ne bis in idem (Centaurus Verlag
Herbolzheim, 2004) 84–130.
62However, given the legal framework governing cross-border ne bis in idem between these
two countries, the Swiss authorities could save the group from prosecution if they were to
initiate proceedings and then formally terminate them, which would be a rather inefﬁcient,
but consistent, approach given the Westphalian rationale of non-intervention among sover-
eign states. See ibid.
63On the various forms of jurisdiction in the context of criminal law, see Petrig (n 8).
64See Markus D Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach
(Oxford University Press, 2014) 4–5; Tatjana Hörnle, ‘Gegenwärtige Strafbegrün-
dungstheorien: Die herkömmliche deutsche Diskussion’ in Andreas von Hirsch, Ulfrid
Neumann and Kurt Seelmann (eds), Strafe – Warum? (Nomos, 2011) 11, 21–23.
65Asp (n 10) 76–78.
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binding legal rule66 regarding how to pick the jurisdiction.67 The EU Member
States, for instance, form one ‘legal space that include[s] actions and events that
transcended boundaries’.68 In this novel area of freedom, security and justice,69
central agencies interact with national law enforcement authorities: the EU’s Judi-
cial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) and the European Police Ofﬁce (Europol) support
national prosecution services and police forces to coordinate mutual legal assist-
ance, provide legal and factual information, or gather evidence abroad.70 Using
their resources, the EU agencies may even seek out the ‘best jurisdiction’ for a
given case. Naturally, from the perspective of the defence, such forum shopping
constitutes an abuse of power, especially since defence lawyers have no direct
access to such transboundary support services.71 Furthermore, the principle of
mutual recognition, according to which a decision taken by a judicial authority
in one EU country must be recognised (and enforced) in other EU countries,
may curtail individual rights accorded in a defendant’s home state.72 The Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant, for instance, which secures arrest and extradition throughout
the EU almost automatically,73 has substantially expanded the reach of law enfor-
cement authorities across Europe. It establishes one ‘implementing area’ that is,
however, based on different substantive criminal laws. Only quite recently has
the EU lawmaker acknowledged that mutual recognition may lead to a ‘unilateral
increase of punitiveness’,74 meaning that the state with the harshest criminal laws
may ask for extradition of alleged perpetrators (subject to the establishment of ju-
risdiction). During this piercing of the Westphalian promise of ‘one jurisdiction,
one law’, individual rights have been sidelined. Today various legal scholars
and the EU Commission all advocate respect for and inclusion of individual
66There is soft law, however, like the Eurojust Guidelines for deciding which jurisdiction
should prosecute, published in the Eurojust Annual Report 2004 (2004), www.eurojust.
europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%
202004/Annual-Report-2004-EN.pdf, 92 et seq.
67See e.g. Böse, Meyer and Schneider (n 21).
68See Jessup (n 16) 2; see also Böse, Meyer and Schneider (n 21) 59 et seq.
69See, for example, from the criminal law point of view, Luchtman (n 8) 14–17.
70See e.g. Alexandra de Moor and Gert Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision’ (2010)
47 Common Market Law Review 1089, 1107.
71For similar problems in cases of ICC prosecutions, see Elena A Baylis, ‘Outsourcing
Investigations’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 2010-20, 145.
72Annika Suominen, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in Cooperation in Criminal
Matters (Intersentia, 2011); Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of
Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law
Review 1277.
73André Klip, European Criminal Law (Intersentia, 2nd edn 2012) 294–5.
74See e.g. Silvia Allegrezza, ‘The Interaction between the ECJ and the ECHR with Respect
to the Protection of Procedural Safeguards after Lisbon’ in Katalin Ligeti (ed), Towards a
Prosecutor for the European Union, vol 1 (Hart Publishing, 2013) 905, 941–2; Klip (n 73)
305–6.
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rights in cross-border cooperation.75 The reasoning behind such initiatives appears
to be evident: if, in national systems, authorities in criminal investigations, prose-
cutions and subsequent trials have to abide carefully by precise procedures and
respect constitutional guarantees and human rights, all the while balancing the
different interests at stake, corresponding standards should apply on a suprana-
tional level of cross-border crime ﬁghting as well as in situations of TCL. In trans-
national cases, the aspiration of adhering to General Principles ought to be the
same, simply because the exact same individual interests are at stake. There is
no valid justiﬁcation for the protective gaps that appear on the side of the
alleged wrongdoer or that of the supposed victim. This is the point where consti-
tutionalism and TCL intersect, and the states that pierce through sovereignty by
way of cooperation must provide a functional equivalent to protect all exposed
citizens.76
The demand for a strict rule dictatingwhere to bring charges is one result of such
reasoning, aiming at a clear and coherent handling of transnational criminal cases
with formal protection for the individuals affected.77 Such a claim is asking for a
resurgence of the bird’s-eye view – that is, towards a modiﬁed bird’s-eye view.
Instead of looking for a set of rules aimed at ‘indirect suppression by international
law through domestic penal law of criminal activities that have actual or potential
transboundary effects’,78 one seeks a structure for a protective coordination scheme.
In theory, different solutions seem feasible here. Each legal community
involved could put forth a protection scheme of its own – onewhich safeguards indi-
viduals’ interests within the respective national legal system. Such a ‘national so-
lution’ would support an individual-based approach to TCL, but in each state
separately. Such a national solution is at the extreme end of the range of possible
answers and rather adheres to a worm’s-eye view, since the focus is on a purely
national answer (to a cross-border problem). At the other end of the spectrum of
possible approaches is the postulation of a common uniform framework – one
that considers individual rights in a cross-border scheme, for all states involved
in cooperation in a coherent and concerted way. Choosing this approach is, as
75See on the part of the defendant: Directive 2010/64/EU of 20 October 2010 on the right to
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ L280 of 26.10.2010, 1; Directive
2012/13/EU of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L142
of 1.6.2012, 1; Directive 2013/48/EU of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer
in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to
have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third
persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, OJ L294 of 6.11.2013, 1.
On the part of the victim: Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing
Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L315 of 14.11.2012, 57.
76Gless and Vervaele (n 9) 5; Schunke (n 15) 131–4; Herlin-Karnell (n 15) 232–9.
77See Juliette Lelieur, ‘“Transnationalising”Ne Bis in Idem: How the Rule of Ne Bis in Idem
Reveals the Principle of Personal Legal Certainty’ (2013) 9Utrecht Law Review 198, 204–5.
78Boister, this volume.
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has been pointed out above, analogous to looking for a modiﬁed bird’s-eye view
striving for a protective coordination scheme safeguarding individuals’ interests.
Legal scholars have considered both the national approach and the common
approach. An example of the national approach would be a speciﬁc test for
mens rea in transnational cases that each nation-state would have to establish
on its own,79 while the more recent initiatives in the EU’s legal framework illus-
trate the possibilities of a common approach.80 And the latter proposal indeed
appears to be the better approach: where states formed close coalitions, which
in turn created speciﬁc bodies for implementing TCL, such as Eurojust, the
EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit or Europol, or other national bodies within the
Schengen cooperation framework, scholars quickly realised that penal power
marching in unison with state sovereignty is a thing of the past. The policy
driving TCL must ensure that individuals’ interests are included, which means
that they must be accounted for at the supranational level. And in fact, this reason-
ing is precisely behind numerous initiatives demanding a strict rule stipulating
how to decide on the forum in cases of conﬂict of jurisdiction or how to implement
a cross-border scheme for ne bis in idem that is in line with an individual-based
approach to overlapping jurisdictions.81
B. General principles and the common denominator
In arguing that a new concept of TCL must include a coordination scheme for
safeguarding the interests of individuals, only the notional question of structure
has been answered, i.e. that it needs a common ground to protect certain interests,
while the question of substance remains open.
In criminal law, state power threatens individuals with harsh consequences in
situations where an individual, or the public, has been wronged by violation of a
(morally substantiated) norm. The state claims a monopoly on the prosecution and
possible punishment of the wrongdoer (with the promise of a criminal justice
system applied fairly and equally), putting citizens on the witness stand, and
taking away the entitlement of victims to proceed on their own (i.e. no ‘vigilante
justice’).
In order to establish a shared coordination system, one must therefore ﬁnd a
strong common denominator which represents the essence of the relevant rules
in criminal law and criminal procedure protecting individual interests in modern
states. Put differently, one must strive to identify the general principles that deter-
mine the relevant rules in national law, which will eventually be capable of
79Gless (n 35); Suominen (n 18).
80See Schunke (n 15) 69–117; Gless (n 5); Ilias Anagnostopoulos, ‘The Right of Access to a
Lawyer in Europe: A Long Road Ahead?’ (2014) European Criminal Law Journal 3.
81See e.g. John Vervaele, ‘Ne Bis in Idem: Towards a Transnational Constitutional Principle
in the EU’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 211, 217–27.
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generating adequate rules for TCL, even if those rules amount to little more than a
coordination system. A tradition of determining such aspirational principles,
however, is lacking, as is consensus on a method for identifying general principles
in international legal frameworks. Therefore, in searching for a strong common
denominator as a base for a coordination system, one can either turn to basic
ideas from legal philosophy or examine existing practice.
(i) Drawing inspiration from legal philosophy
A promising approach in legal philosophy is to differentiate between general prin-
ciples and mere rules; this approach was used even before Ronald Dworkin reﬁned
it.82 His theory distinguishes axioms from working mechanisms and has been used
and adjusted by scholars in manifold ﬁelds,83 including international criminal
law.84 Whilst this approach has met with some criticism,85 it has been accepted
as a structure for establishing principles and rules in international law. For instance,
when applying Article 38 of the ICC Statute, one of the most prominent examples
of a reference to ‘general principles’, the statutory rule uses the term ‘general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations’.86 It does not, however, provide
further explanation for identifying the content or implications. While the question
of how to identify and justify general principles is contentious,87 it is clear that a
body of TCL must be based on a common denominator of elementary regulations
for criminal law and criminal procedure, and that at the same time one must try to
avoid a web of principles, which – at a high level of abstraction – cannot gain sub-
stance and will thus only feign a collective foundation.88
According to Dworkin, the necessary difference between legal principles and
legal rules can be achieved logically in the following way:
82Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) 22–28.
83See, for a discussion of rules and standards in US constitutional law, Kathleen M Sullivan,
‘Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards’ (1992) 106Harvard LawReview 22, 56–59.
84See e.g. Lelieur (n 77) 202.
85With regard to the fact that a differentiation between principles and rules is difﬁcult – and
maybe sometimes impossible, see Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg, ‘Rechtsﬁndung und Rechts-
fortbildung im Völkerstrafrecht’ (2007) 154 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht 80, 94; see
further Alain Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, Karin
Oellers-Frahm and Christian J Tams (eds), The Statute of the International Court of
Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2012) 731, 834.
86‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such dis-
putes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or par-
ticular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations;…’
87See Pellet (n 85) 1–3, 250–69; M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘A Functional Approach to “General
Principles of International Law”’ (1990) 11 Michigan Journal of International Law 768,
770–2.
88See Stuckenberg (n 85) 94.
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Both sets of standards point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular
circumstances but they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted or it
is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.89
In contrast, principles operate differently: ‘Even those [principles] which look
most like rules do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically when
the conditions provided are met’.90 The distinction between principles and rules
reveals a solution to the problems resulting from legal pluralism in the situation
of cross-border prosecution. In cases of conﬂicting laws, one can search for, or
rather establish, the underlying principle, which sets the overarching directive,
but does not automatically determine the legal consequences following from it.
Such an approach relies on a deductive method, which eventually ascertains a
(prevailing) rule by way of a principle.
Going down that road, one can exemplify this abstract reasoning using our
aforementioned case of the music-swapping nationals who want to conduct
business across borders, andwho eventually run into trouble because of the conﬂict-
ing laws on the two sides of the border. According to theDworkinianmodel, the two
colliding rules can be resolved by retreating to an underlying principle, which here
is legal certainty: ‘If two rules conﬂict, one of them cannot be a valid rule. The
decision as to which is valid, and which must be abandoned or recast, must be
made by appealing to considerations beyond the rules themselves’.91 Thus, one
has to retreat to general principle when the national rules of ne bis in idem
applied to a case – given the facts – lead to clear, but conﬂicting, legal obligations.
For instance, such is the casewhen the national rule on one side of the border inhibits
prosecution, whereas a different rule on the other side of the border compels prose-
cution of the same conduct. In such cases, it must be determined which rule will
serve (a common understanding of) justice best and should therefore be applied;
neither the defendant nor the prosecutor nor the victim has a right to the best of
all possible worlds. Responding to individuals’ interest in clarity, one must use
the underlying principles in order to establish a system that will lead to legal cer-
tainty.92 However, as Dworkin has correctly pointed out, the legal consequences
ﬂowing therefrom are not automatically spelled out. The question remains: How
can the underlying principles be translated into a system that determines the relevant
rules in a certain case and will allow for a working mechanism of the ne bis in idem
principle? Or, to phrase the question more abstractly: How can the underlying
89Dworkin (n 82) 24.
90Ibid, 25.
91Ibid, 26–27.
92See, for a classic application, Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1688–94; for an application in
TCL, see Lelieur (n 77) 203–4.
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principles be ‘transnationalised’ in order to establish rules that ‘transnationalise’ the
protection of individuals affected by TCL?93
Returning to our bird’s-eye/worm’s-eye divide, with separating national rules
implementing ne bis in idem from their traditional foundations and adapting the
safeguard for the transnational level, one rather takes a modiﬁed bird’s-eye
view.94 Eventually, a transnationalised ne bis in idem would be different from
its national counterparts, because it must provide legal certainty for the individual
in a system where different countries have different criminal codes. Thus, it must
not only prevent double prosecution or double jeopardy, but also prevent parallel
prosecutions, and determine the rules that serve justice best in all situations where
one national lawmaker decides not to criminalise a certain type of conduct while
other lawmakers decide differently.
(ii) Drawing inspiration from practice
Apart from drawing inspiration from legal philosophy, a glance at what happens in
practice could also help identify general principles for TCL. Cooperation among
states in the ﬁeld of criminal law and the fragmentation of any legal system
necessitates the identiﬁcation of common principles in various situations.95
Quite often such principles are needed as a ﬁll-in;96 for example, the ‘general prin-
ciples’ referred to in Article 21(1) of the ICC Statute97 serve as a subsidiary source
ﬁlling in normative gaps.98 The approach is empirical, and the task is to generate
rules via a comparative process. In analysing national law, one must identify
relevant regularities in the vast amount of regulations so as to deﬁne a new rule
(relevant to international criminal law), while also sorting through irrelevant
inconsistencies.99 This task of establishing a valid ‘substratum’ and deducing a
93See Lelieur (n 77) 203–7.
94Ibid, 204–7; Vervaele (n 81) 219–26.
95See Stuckenberg (n 85) 93–94.
96See Bassiouni (n 87) 774.
97‘The Court shall apply: (a) In the ﬁrst place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules
of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the
international law of armed conﬂict; (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by
the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided
that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and
internationally recognized norms and standards.’
98See e.g. Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Volume 1: Foundations and
General Part (Oxford University Press, 2013) 76.
99Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law:
Purpose, Coverage and Methodology’ (1999) 835 International Review of the Red Cross,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq3k.htm; Stuckenberg (n 85)
93–96. For more information on comparative approaches for establishing general prin-
ciples, see HC Gutteridge, ‘Comparative Law and the Law of Nations’ in William E
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concrete rule therefrom is, as many scholars have pointed out, practically impos-
sible, especially with regard to the vast amount of (and the differences between)
legal systems of countries that are signatories to the ICC Statute.100 Thus, the
clear option is to turn to an evaluative process, weighing the laws in light of the
objective of prosecuting core crimes. The empirical approach is modiﬁed by a nor-
mative element.101 Again, if one wants to ﬁt these approaches within the frame of
bird’s-eye view versus worm’s-eye view, the empirical approach rather mirrors the
worm’s-eye view, or rather the worm’s-eye view in adding up all the different rules
governing the fate of individuals affected, whereas a more evaluative approach
corresponds with the proposed modiﬁed bird’s-eye view – recovering an overall
picture of what is needed for a coordination system that actually safeguards indi-
vidual interests. However, if a ﬁnding of general principles of TCL detaches itself
too much from any empirical basis in the comparative process, it runs into pro-
blems with regard to legitimacy.102 This struggle is apparent in the case law of
all supranational courts intending to ﬁnd general principles: they either resort to
a more empirical approach or to a deductive testing. In the ﬁrst case they look
for a common denominator in national laws. In the second case they place the
emphasis on a certain objective to be reached.
In European criminal law, for instance, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
has to ﬁnd general principles of procedure deﬁning rights of defence when Euro-
pean organs and agencies take part in investigations without a procedural code at
hand. Here too, the ECJ ﬁrst looks for a common denominator, namely the
‘common traditions of the constitutions of the EU Member States’, and – if the
result lacks persuasiveness as such – points to European peculiarities often by
reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).103
The ECtHR has ventured down this path before by combining a comparative
method with its two techniques of interpretation, namely the ‘living instrument’
doctrine and the ‘practical and effective’ doctrine.104 In so doing, the Court ﬁrst
Butler (ed), International Law in Comparative Perspective (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980) 13
ff; Bassiouni (n 87) 785–7, 813–16; Hermann Mosler, ‘General Principles of International
Law’ in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol 2 (Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1985) 89 ff, 97–103.
100See Claus Kress, ‘Zur Methode der Rechtsﬁndung im Allgemeinen Teil des Völkerstraf-
rechts’ (1999) 111 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 597, 608–13; Stuck-
enberg (n 85) 93–94.
101See e.g. Prosecutor v Erdemovic (Judgement) ICTY IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997), Sep-
arate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, [25]: ‘the prevailing number of nations
within each of the main families of laws’.
102Stuckenberg (n 85).
103See e.g. Klip (n 73) 153–4.
104Sabine Gless and Jeannine Martin, ‘The Comparative Method in European Courts: A
Comparison between the CJEU and ECtHR?’ (2014) 1(1) Bergen Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice 36, 42–44.
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establishes the validity of a principle, then points out a particular need, and then
deﬁnes a new rule accordingly.105
Comparing the two European Courts, the practice of the ECJ appears to bemore
far-reaching. Not only does it rely on arguments drawn from history and from the
objective of ‘contextual harmonisation’, it furthermore establishes ‘general prin-
ciples of law’ in a creative manner, primarily by appraising the objectives of EU
law.106 The aspiration for new common ground corresponds with the consolidation
of the policy framework at the EU level.107 The need for a more aspirational
approach when identifying the general principles can also be seen in international
criminal law stricto sensu, which – as explained above – is bound to ﬁnd general
principles as a subsidiary source ﬁlling in (signiﬁcant) normative gaps.108
Obviously, one cannot adhere to a single method of sustaining international crim-
inal law stricto sensu with general principles; rather, one must use a combination
of techniques – including empirical and normative-deductive methods.109
(iii) General principles and rules for TCL
A more empirical approach would involve collecting the relevant regulations that
are valid in the different areas of TCL, such as rules on the applicability of dom-
estic criminal law to extraterritorial conduct, rules governing mutual legal assist-
ance in criminal matters, rules of European criminal law, and rules in the various
national and international legal frameworks.110 Subsequently, one would have to
compare and identify relevant convergences, patterns, etc., aswell as any discrepan-
cies, using a comparative-inductive method. Going down this road, one could, for
instance, compare all EU Member States’ laws on criminal jurisdiction, as well
as rules established by EU institutions, like the Eurojust guidelines on jurisdic-
tion,111 in order to develop a prevailing pattern for settling jurisdictional
105Ibid, 44–45.
106Klip (n 73) 152–6.
107For discussion on a corresponding EU policy, see contributions in Mireille Delmas-
Marty (ed), What Kind of Criminal Policy for Europe? (Kluwer, 1996); Asp (n 10) 70–76.
108 For an illustration of the reasoning in the case against Dražen Erdemović (referred to at
n 101), see ‘Case Information Sheet: “Pilica Farm” (IT-96-22) Dražen Erdemović’, Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
erdemovic/cis/en/cis_erdemovic_en.pdf, where the judges needed to deﬁne the require-
ments for duress as the defendant claimed that he had participated in the massacre at Srbre-
nica only because he was pressured to do so (under threat of death/at gunpoint). For a
discussion see Kress (n 100).
109See Ambos (n 98) 78; Martino Mona, ‘Strafrechtsvergleichung und Comparative Justice:
Zum Verhältnis zwischen Rechtsvergleichung, Grundlagenforschung und Rechtsphiloso-
phie’ in Susanne Beck, Christoph Burchard and Bijan Fateh-Moghadam (eds), Strafrechts-
vergleichung als Problem und Lösung (Nomos, 2011) 103–19.
110Gless (n 22) 290–1.
111Eurojust Guidelines for deciding which jurisdiction should prosecute: see Eurojust
(n 66).
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conﬂicts.112 Ultimately, general principles could be inferred from similar sets of
empirical ﬁndings. Such an approach is to a certain extent similar to the establish-
ment of rules of customary international law.113 By counting and comparing exist-
ing concrete and individual rules, one tries to establish a generally valid abstract
principle. However, an approach which puts the empirical moment at the top will
encounter certain difﬁculties. First, it must present a certain number of similar
laws and practices in order to establish a pattern; second, this line-up must be eval-
uated. In comparative law, onemust assess the spirit behind the rules – that is, search
for the ‘opinio iuris’. Otherwise the ﬁnding will be too ‘formal’ and the basis of val-
idity will lie primarily with the number of similar laws found in different criminal
justice systems.
In contrast, one could also deduct basic principles from the objective of an indi-
vidual-based approach to TCL: the achievement of justice by cross-border law
enforcement while balancing the different interests involved, notably those of the
individuals affected. Such an approach may, but will not necessarily, identify exist-
ing principles, in addition to locating principles that ought to be valid for transna-
tional criminal cases. Thus, the determination of principles is more aspirational
than deductive. Some general principles of TCL might not even have a counterpart
in national law, as was explained with the transnationalisation of ne bis in idem.114
In other words, this approach establishes ‘aspirational’ rules rather than merely
reﬂecting the lex lata.115 This method leans towards an approach used in compara-
tive law, when scholars resort to a ‘functional comparison’ or to what is called ‘wer-
tende Rechtsvergleichung’ by combining the empirical method with an appraisal.
The process involves looking at certain situations and comparing legal solutions
provided by different national laws from a ﬁxed point of comparison – the so-
called tertium comparationis–which, in this context, could be a balanced resolution
for the situation of a positive conﬂict of jurisdiction when an internet-based music-
swapping service conducts business across borders. Such a method is widely
used116 – for instance, by scholars of EU law when drafting proposals on how to
determine jurisdiction.117 An approach that does not solely focus on the number
of laws and cases, but also gives weight to ‘good practice’ and the ‘opinio iuris’,
leads to a formal-material basis of validity. A normative teleological approach,
112See Böse, Meyer and Schneider (n 21) 19.
113See Henckaerts (n 99); Kress (n 100) 608–13.
114See for similar approach in International Criminal Law Cassese’s, International Criminal
Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn., 2013) 9–15.
115Gless and Vervaele (n 9) 5.
116See Ambos (n 98) 78–79.
117Luchtman (n 8) 26–32; Arndt Sinn, Jursidiktionskonﬂikte bei grenzüberschreitender
Kriminalität, Conﬂicts of Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Crime Situations (Universitätsverlag
Osnabrück, 2012) 597–615; Frank Zimmermann, Strafgewaltkonﬂikte in der Europäischen
Union. Ein Regelungsvorschlag zur Wahrung materieller und prozessualer strafrechtlicher
Garantien sowie staatlicher Straﬁnteressen (Nomos, 2014) 369–454; Böse, Meyer and
Schneider (n 21) 435–43.
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which deducts principles from the objective of transnational criminal law, is justiﬁed
only by the objective – i.e. the achievement of justice by cross-border law enforce-
ment while balancing the different interests involved, in light of human rights
norms. This is a purely material basis of validity, which, in turn, runs the risk that
the result may only appeal to the eye of the beholder.
Both methods lead to core aspects of criminal law shared in modern societies,
such as the principle that only competent authorities may hand down a verdict, that
guilt must be established before criminal punishment, that each accused person has
a right to a fair trial, and that one should not be punished twice for the same act.118
Therefore, the two methods should be used in parallel, which can help reduce the
risk of one-sided conclusions. The deduction of general principles by a judge may
appear a risky operation as such an evaluation always reﬂects partly what is in the
eye of the beholder. Such a threat may be balanced by a comparative overview of
national principles, the concrete meaning and implications of which, however, will
always differ somewhat in each national system.
C. A defendant-based approach – backed by general principles
In order to safeguard the interests worthy of protection that are affected by trans-
national criminal justice, we need more than a common scheme of coordination in
transnational cases; the system must be based on a transnationally accepted set of
general principles necessary to determine the relevant rules.
This ﬁnding may look mundane to some, but the debate surrounding TCL has
a long way to go before it resolves the perception of transnational prosecution
shaped by the tradition of Westphalian state order.119 Transnational cases, in
which one individual allegedly commits an act that affects different jurisdictions,
have only recently been recognised as one form of transnational criminal proceed-
ing conducted across borders by different states (‘international arbeitsteilige
Strafverfolgung’).120 For many years, even scholars of international criminal
law saw these cases as a variety of co-existing national cases with little connection
to and coordination with each other. The notional divide between the jurisdictions
involved justiﬁed the situation of transnational cases being governed by different
sets of self-contained rules, which derived from the respective national
legal frameworks instead of a coherent transnational set of rules. Case
studies,121 however, suggest that if one examines the speciﬁc principles of
118See contributions in (2013) 9 (4)Utrecht Law Review, special issue, Law Should Govern:
Aspiring General Principles for Transnational Criminal Justice.
119For a 19th-century opinion, see Julius Friedrich Heinrich Abegg, Ueber die Bestrafung
der im Ausland begangenen Verbrechen (Franz Seraph Storno, 1819); Karl Binding, Hand-
buch des Strafrechts (Duncker & Humblot, 1885, reprint Scientia, 1991) 372–5.
120Schomburg et al (n 58) 22–30.
121Soering v UK, App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989); Stokjovic v France and Belgium,
App no 25303/08 (ECtHR, 27 October 2011).
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criminal law as seriously as is necessary, cooperating states will be obliged to
share the burden of protecting the interests of affected individuals. Such a
shared burden mechanism must be based on general principles, which determine
the rules that effectively transform traditional features of criminal law into TCL.
Such general principles do not have a mere descriptive capacity, but must function
as ‘aspirational rules’. Therefore, in the future, one’s aspiration must be to look for
a set of principles aimed at protecting the interests of individuals and translating
them into rules that compensate those whose interests are at stake when prosecu-
tion crosses borders, instead of identifying those sets of rules aimed at ‘indirect
suppression by international law through domestic penal law of criminal activities
that have actual or potential transboundary effects’.122 A theory for TCL must take
the time-tested principles of criminal law and criminal procedure, which protect
the individual, into account. The rationale is simple: when criminal prosecution
carries harsh consequences for affected individuals, it must be bound by special
safeguards and may be held to the different, sometimes even higher, standards
resulting from the general principles governing rule-making in TCL.
IV. Conclusion
Having considered both the bird’s-eye view and the worm’s-eye view of TCL, a
common pattern emerges. It centres on the need to take individuals’ interests
into account, or, as Boister himself explains in this volume: ‘legality and the pro-
tection of human rights must be recognised as a governing framework. Any system
of extraterritorial enactment and enforcement of criminal laws immediately runs
into problems of legality… in imposing criminal proscriptions on individuals in
other states who may have no warning of the criminality of their actions.’123
Even though Boister gives some authority to the interests of individuals, such con-
siderations are not immediately visible from the bird’s-eye view of TCL. They
remain hidden among other contentions, but they emerge as a pattern if one
takes a worm’s-eye view, working up to a new bird’s-eye view that beholds an
individual-based approach of TCL; the new perspective marks a continuum
rather than a divide.
If we bear in mind the individual’s perspective, two features will sit at the core
of future debates on TCL. First, TCL requires a broad deﬁnition, one which places
the necessary value on the individuals’ interests affected. An individual-based
approach to TCL must include a shared cooperation scheme so as to transform
general principles of criminal law and criminal procedure from national frame-
works into principles at the relevant transnational level, and thus safeguard the
interests of the affected individuals. Secondly, legal frameworks of transnationally
122Boister, this volume.
123Ibid, with reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 Decem-
ber 1948), UNGA Res 217 A(III), Art 11(2).
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accepted basic rules protecting the interests of defendants must accompany the
enhancement of legal frameworks of transnational crime control that transcend
national jurisdictions. Only if this is achieved will Boister’s vision for TCL
come true, and alleged criminals will genuinely become ‘members of multiple nor-
mative communities, local, territorial, extraterritorial, and non-territorial in
nature’.124
124Boister, this volume.
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